> Our collective judgment is just intersubjective odium.
I like the term "intersubjective" . . . there are shared subjective positions that aren't quite objective but also seem like more than purely, singularly subjective.
Max, you wrote, "There is a sense in which taking mythic truths on board, even in their symbols, representations, and daimons, commits us to bizarre metaphysics. Yet, to behave as if mythic entities were factual can be efficacious. Such efficacy in the factual world lies in how our adopted myths affect our behavior, as the truths of the Mythic Order transform us from within."
There are three primary sources for this: The first is Anselm’s Ontological Argument. Modern academics say they can refute Anselm by pointing out that Existence is not a quality; they say we can imagine that this being must possess existence, but it is still only imagination; it does not prove that being exists. But, Anselm’s Argument is not an argument or proof in any modern sense of that word. It says, “Look at your own sense of being!” It is like a painting, a figurative arrow pointing at what is absolutely real, something that should be obvious to anyone who notices it.
The second is George Berkeley, who suggested that this world and all that is in it is only an idea in God’s mind. In Being Dreams Forgetting, the world is only a dream in the mind of Anselm’s being. But as I recall, Berkeley was worried about how two different people are able to see the same chair in a room. This was a problem he struggled with until very late in his life. Even though he claimed to have solved it properly, I could not find his answer. Something about "tar water" as I recall.
The third source is Leibniz; see Ontological Monadology [13], https://burnteliot.substack.com/p/ontological-monadology-13 I added two assumptions about beings/monads: perceiving number and perceiving ignorance. This allows the infinite plenum of beings to be characterized as only one: it is this being that is described in Being Dreams Forgetting. But if it is only one, then it cannot be distinguished from the reality itself, which I defined as identical with being and with awareness -- like a theater within which everything else comes and goes (ch. 2). So, somewhat Nagarjuna-like, it is not one, not many, not neither, not both. It is simply reality itself (yours, mine, etc., all the same) wherein number appears.
Hence I might say that "Reality imagines Man in Its own Image." Sound familiar? It says, this (your) being in and of itself (which is the same as your reality and the same as your awareness) has within it the compelling illusion of infinitely many individual persons in infinitely many different worlds. Time, Place, Number, and Ignorance exist within the illusion, and the illusion appears within your being. Your individuality exists only as illusion. This is a very strong basis for ethics.
Now the question is, can your absolute being/reality/awareness be directly known? That is kind of what Krishnamurti was talking about: it isn't a matter of how to know that, it is a matter of how did we forget. That raises some other interesting questions, like, "What is lucid dreaming?"
I have so far resisted Berkeleyan Idealism, even though I have been curious about modern Idealists like Bernardo Kastrup. Simulation theory is depressing and weird, which, of course, is not an argument against it. That said, I want to find the pieces of these thought strains that can and should be reconciled with science and naturalist metaphysical commitments. You have offered a couple of very nice trailheads with these links and some fabulous passages, like this: "Each awakening is a complete and absolute reawakening to reality. The joy of this is in no way diminished by the problems of life. It is perfect awareness of the reality of being this being, of being limitless reality. This being, self-aware and self-knowing, recalls every moment of every dream, not as a troubling recollection of miseries but as a wondrous journey home."
You might find this to be considerably more interesting than Berkeley or Kastrup:
"... influential British idealist, J. M. E. McTaggart (1866–1925), defended a theory in which reality is a community of individual spirits connected by the relation of love.[189] McTaggart defends ontological idealism through a mereological argument which argues only spirits can be substances, as well as through an argument for the unreality of time (a position he also defends in The Unreality of Time).[189]
In The Nature of Existence (1927), McTaggart's argument relies on the premise that substances are infinitely divisible and cannot have simple parts. Furthermore, each of their infinite parts determines every other part. He then analyzes various characteristics of reality such as time, matter, sensation, and cogitation and attempts to show they cannot be real elements of real substances, but must be mere appearances.[190] For example, the existence of matter cannot be inferred based on sensations, since they cannot be divided to infinity (and thus cannot be substances). Spirits on the other hand are true infinitely divisible substances. They have "the quality of having content, all of which is the content of one or more selves", and know themselves through direct perception as substances persisting through time.[191] For McTaggart, there is a multiplicity of spirits, which are nevertheless related to each other harmoniously through their love for each other.[170] " -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism
When I was first getting interested in idealism, McTaggart was generally regarded as the last thorough-going metaphysical Idealist. Not particularly difficult to read. IMO, he set a new, very high standard for the subject, and I haven't looked at many others since then.
> Our collective judgment is just intersubjective odium.
I like the term "intersubjective" . . . there are shared subjective positions that aren't quite objective but also seem like more than purely, singularly subjective.
I'm glad, Domenic. This bothers a lot of people.
Max, you wrote, "There is a sense in which taking mythic truths on board, even in their symbols, representations, and daimons, commits us to bizarre metaphysics. Yet, to behave as if mythic entities were factual can be efficacious. Such efficacy in the factual world lies in how our adopted myths affect our behavior, as the truths of the Mythic Order transform us from within."
Here is something I adapted from a combination of Anselm, Berkeley, and Leibniz. https://burnteliot.substack.com/p/being-dreams-forgetting-3
There are three primary sources for this: The first is Anselm’s Ontological Argument. Modern academics say they can refute Anselm by pointing out that Existence is not a quality; they say we can imagine that this being must possess existence, but it is still only imagination; it does not prove that being exists. But, Anselm’s Argument is not an argument or proof in any modern sense of that word. It says, “Look at your own sense of being!” It is like a painting, a figurative arrow pointing at what is absolutely real, something that should be obvious to anyone who notices it.
The second is George Berkeley, who suggested that this world and all that is in it is only an idea in God’s mind. In Being Dreams Forgetting, the world is only a dream in the mind of Anselm’s being. But as I recall, Berkeley was worried about how two different people are able to see the same chair in a room. This was a problem he struggled with until very late in his life. Even though he claimed to have solved it properly, I could not find his answer. Something about "tar water" as I recall.
The third source is Leibniz; see Ontological Monadology [13], https://burnteliot.substack.com/p/ontological-monadology-13 I added two assumptions about beings/monads: perceiving number and perceiving ignorance. This allows the infinite plenum of beings to be characterized as only one: it is this being that is described in Being Dreams Forgetting. But if it is only one, then it cannot be distinguished from the reality itself, which I defined as identical with being and with awareness -- like a theater within which everything else comes and goes (ch. 2). So, somewhat Nagarjuna-like, it is not one, not many, not neither, not both. It is simply reality itself (yours, mine, etc., all the same) wherein number appears.
Hence I might say that "Reality imagines Man in Its own Image." Sound familiar? It says, this (your) being in and of itself (which is the same as your reality and the same as your awareness) has within it the compelling illusion of infinitely many individual persons in infinitely many different worlds. Time, Place, Number, and Ignorance exist within the illusion, and the illusion appears within your being. Your individuality exists only as illusion. This is a very strong basis for ethics.
Now the question is, can your absolute being/reality/awareness be directly known? That is kind of what Krishnamurti was talking about: it isn't a matter of how to know that, it is a matter of how did we forget. That raises some other interesting questions, like, "What is lucid dreaming?"
"... the truths of the Mythic Order transform us from within." https://burnteliot.substack.com/p/the-flowering-of-a-wonderful-law
I have so far resisted Berkeleyan Idealism, even though I have been curious about modern Idealists like Bernardo Kastrup. Simulation theory is depressing and weird, which, of course, is not an argument against it. That said, I want to find the pieces of these thought strains that can and should be reconciled with science and naturalist metaphysical commitments. You have offered a couple of very nice trailheads with these links and some fabulous passages, like this: "Each awakening is a complete and absolute reawakening to reality. The joy of this is in no way diminished by the problems of life. It is perfect awareness of the reality of being this being, of being limitless reality. This being, self-aware and self-knowing, recalls every moment of every dream, not as a troubling recollection of miseries but as a wondrous journey home."
Thanks for your kind words about my comments.
You might find this to be considerably more interesting than Berkeley or Kastrup:
"... influential British idealist, J. M. E. McTaggart (1866–1925), defended a theory in which reality is a community of individual spirits connected by the relation of love.[189] McTaggart defends ontological idealism through a mereological argument which argues only spirits can be substances, as well as through an argument for the unreality of time (a position he also defends in The Unreality of Time).[189]
In The Nature of Existence (1927), McTaggart's argument relies on the premise that substances are infinitely divisible and cannot have simple parts. Furthermore, each of their infinite parts determines every other part. He then analyzes various characteristics of reality such as time, matter, sensation, and cogitation and attempts to show they cannot be real elements of real substances, but must be mere appearances.[190] For example, the existence of matter cannot be inferred based on sensations, since they cannot be divided to infinity (and thus cannot be substances). Spirits on the other hand are true infinitely divisible substances. They have "the quality of having content, all of which is the content of one or more selves", and know themselves through direct perception as substances persisting through time.[191] For McTaggart, there is a multiplicity of spirits, which are nevertheless related to each other harmoniously through their love for each other.[170] " -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism
When I was first getting interested in idealism, McTaggart was generally regarded as the last thorough-going metaphysical Idealist. Not particularly difficult to read. IMO, he set a new, very high standard for the subject, and I haven't looked at many others since then.
Vol. 1: https://archive.org/details/natureofexistenc01mctauoft
Vol. 2: https://archive.org/details/natureofexistenc02mctauoft